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POLITICAL–ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF 
PENSIONS IN JAPANGENE PARK
 
*University of California, Berkeley
 
The Political-Economic Dimension of Pensions: 




This article examines how pensions are interwoven with the public and
private financial system in Japan and the consequences for pension reform.
A growing literature focuses on the multifaceted ways in which pensions
are interwoven with the larger political economy. This study builds on this
literature and finds that (a) public and private pensions have been
integrated deeply into Japan’s system of developmental finance, (b) this
integration has created new economic and political problems as
governments have attempted to shift away from its developmental model
through deregulation, liberalization, and administrative reform, and (c)
because pension reform is intimately linked with these reforms, it involves
addressing fundamental issues regarding the role of the state, finance, and
firms. These findings collectively illustrate that pension reform is not only
driven by issues of fiscal viability and benefit levels, but also by the nature
of the way in which pensions are integrated into a country’s system of
finance.
 
In the postwar era, the Japanese pension system played a critical role in
the broader system of public and private finance, providing funds to
finance industrial development and to reward supporters of the ruling
party. In recent years, however, the pensions–finance nexus has generated
a host of new political and economic problems that reach deeply into
Japan’s political economy. Much of the existing welfare state literature
focuses on pensions as benefit provision, and analyzes pension politics
from the perspective of benefit levels and battles over retrenchment (Bald-
win; Bonoli; Esping-Andersen and Korpi; Myles and Pierson; Pierson).
More recent work has begun to explore connections between pensions
and political economy more broadly, including the links between pen-
sions and industrial relations and between pensions and systems of





 This article builds on this new research to explore
the pension–finance connection, demonstrating how the specific nature





The Japanese public pension system is partially funded, meaning that









These funds have become an important source of public finance for a wide
variety of purposes, from supporting development to buying political





 plans have provided firms with patient capital, and
the capital from funded private pensions has been heavily regulated, with
the Ministry of Finance (MOF) strongly influencing investment decisions.
But the integration of pensions into Japan’s system of finance has given
rise to a set of new pension and economic problems as Japan has
attempted to shift away from its developmental model through deregu-
lation, liberalization, and administrative reform. As political actors
attempt to determine who invests pension funds and how investments
are made, they must address fundamental issues regarding the role of the
state, finance, and firms. Japanese officials are increasingly aware that the
goal of pension investments should not be to provide patient capital or
public finance, but rather to ensure the solvency of the pension funds
themselves. Making this transition, however, has been neither easy nor
fully successful. Pension problems are woven deeply into Japan’s political
economy and current financial problems. Political and bureaucratic actors
strongly influence the substance of reforms, and they are often reluctant
to cede access to financial resources that have served a multitude of useful
economic, political, and bureaucratic ends.
 
JAPAN’S PENSION SYSTEM: FINANCIAL ROLE IN 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
 
This section describes the basic outlines of both the public and private
pension systems and explains how each was incorporated into Japan’s





 The key distinction, though, for the purposes of this









). While both public and private pension systems have been
used to promote developmental ends, they have been integrated into
Japan’s system of finance in very different ways. Public pensions, which
are partially funded, have become an important source of public finance.
Private pensions, by contrast, have been used as a source of “patient


















). The Mutual Aid pensions are the oldest. They cover civil servants,
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covers employees in firms with over five persons. While the Employee
Pension is mandatory and the government manages the funds, there is





)—that companies can self-manage if they choose to do so.
This distinction is pointed out to avoid confusion because the names of
the pensions are so similar. The critical point is that one part is public and
the other private. The National Pension was created in 1959 and acts as
a type of residual pension for those not covered by the Employee Pension
or Mutual Aid Pension.
Japan’s public pension system is a partially funded system. The
National Pension is essentially PAYG, but the Employee Pension has been
partially funded since its creation. At present, the combined sum of
Japan’s public pensions, excluding the Mutual Aid pensions, is about 1.4
trillion yen, or about just over 1 trillion dollars (Table 1). Relative to
pension payments, this is a relatively large sum. In 1996, the total reserves
for the public pension funds were enough to cover benefits for 5.2 years.
In the United States, there was only about a year’s reserve, and France
and Germany maintain only a few months reserve (Shibata).
The funds from the National Pension and Employee Pension, until
April 2001, were transferred to the Trust Fund Bureau, which is overseen
by the MOF (the changes to this system are discussed in the following
section). Funds from the postal savings system were also deposited to the
Trust Fund Bureau. The MOF oversaw these combined funds and distrib-
uted the pension and postal savings funds through the Fiscal Investment




. In 1999, the total cumulative funds of the
Trust Fund Bureau were 436 trillion yen—at about 120 yen to the dollar,
that is 4 trillion dollars, a sum larger than Japan’s economy or about three









1989 702,175 32,216 734,391
1990 768,605 36,317 804,922
1991 839,970 43,572 883,542
1992 911,340 51,275 962,615
1993 978,705 58,468 1,037,174
1994 1,045,318 63,712 1,109,030
1995 1,118,111 69,516 1,187,628
1996 1,184,579 74,493 1,263,072
1997 1,257,560 84,683 1,342,243








tute the majority of the Trust Fund Bureau, but pension deposits have
grown, and in 1999, accounted for 134 trillion yen out of 436 trillion yen.
The funds from the Trust Fund Bureau and FILP have been the key
link between Japan’s pension system and the nation’s developmental
policies. The Trust Fund Bureau was created after World War II to ratio-
nalize the collection and distribution of various funds and to centralize
the MOF’s control of the allocation of these funds. In the early 1950s, the
consolidation of these funds was paralleled by the creation of specialized
public corporations that served public purposes, which in the early years
of FILP revolved around promoting industrialization. The Japan Devel-
opment Bank (JDB) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan, two of the most
well-known public corporations, both served as key institutional pillars
in Japan’s industrialization strategy.
In the early postwar period, capital was highly scarce. Government
control over the allocation of FILP funds enabled the government to steer
capital to key industries. The JDB alone provided 22 percent of capital to
these industries. Between 1953 and 1955, JDB financing accounted for 23.1
percent of all investments in electric power, 33.6 percent in shipbuilding,
29.8 percent in coalmining and 10.6 percent in new steel plants (Johnson).
These figures underestimate the real impact of government financing,
because such financing had a strong signaling effect to the private sector
by indicating the government’s commitment to strategic sectors
(Johnson).
As Table 2 shows, “industry/technology” uses accounted for the larg-




Allocation of FILP Funds by Use, Various Years
 
1955 1965 1975 1985 1997 1998 1999
1 Housing 13.8 13.9 21.4 25.4 35.3 35.6 32.7
2 Living environment 7.7 12.4 16.7 15.7 18.5 17.5 17.1
3 Social welfare 2.1 3.6 3.4 2.8 4.2 4 3.8
4 Education 4.5 3.1 2.9 3.6 2.1 2.1 2.1
5 Small and mid-sized 
businesses
8.1 12.6 15.6 18 13 16.7 16.1
6 Agriculture, forestry, and 
fisheries
8.9 7.2 4.1 4.3 2.6 2.4 2.2
7 National land preservation in 
the event of disaster
7.7 3.1 1.2 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.7
8 Road construction 3.7 7.9 8 8.8 9.7 9.1 8.6
9 Transportation/
Communications
12.2 13.9 12.7 8.4 4.2 1.7 1.9
10 Regional development 8.5 7 3.3 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.5
11 Industry/Technology 15.8 7.8 3 2.9 2.4 2.4 3.6




: Ministry of Finance.
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and “trade/economic cooperation” also accounting for relatively large
shares. With priority on industrialization-related activities, returns on the
pension fund investments were not a priority. This bias has continued
even after FILP funds shifted away from industrialization toward more
politically motivated uses—such as responding to calls for greater envi-
ronmental spending, housing, and welfare in the late 1960s and 1970s (see
Table 2).
The amount of funds increased exponentially growing between 1955
and 1999 by a factor of 131 and became a source of funds that the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) has used to respond to the demands of key
constituencies and co-opt opposition issues. Opaque accounting, minimal
oversight, and lack of deliberation in the Diet allowed the funds to be
used easily for politically expedient purposes, but the political nature of
investment decisions has also hindered sound decision making. As will
be discussed in the subsequent section, criticisms of the current system
have led to several key reform initiatives. Who controls these funds and
under what conditions one exercises control have emerged as contested
political issues.
The use of pension funds to invest in infrastructure projects or other
public goods is not unique to Japan. Sweden’s AP pension system, like
Japan’s public pension, has been used to achieve a wide variety of ends,
such as investment in housing and the provision of debt capital to firms.
These funds, as in Japan, have also been a very large source of financing.
Between 1970 and 1973, Sweden’s pension system accounted for 35 per-
cent of Sweden’s total credit supply, although this figure declined in
subsequent years (Pontusson).
There are, however, several interesting differences worth noting. In
Sweden, labor unions and the Social Democratic Party, SAP, have played
a key role in the creation of the pension funds and the management of
these funds. SAP was responsible for creating a partially funded pension
system as opposed to a PAYG system. SAP justified partial funding as a
way to create a “buffer” that could be used to protect against sharp
increases in pension fees. Another key justification was that the funds
would create an important source of investment capital. The confedera-
tion of blue-collar unions, LO, oversees the pension funds, and the use of
pension funds has been partly driven by the concerns of labor. Providing
access to low-cost housing and keeping investment levels high are both
good examples. At the same time, there is a built-in countervailing incen-
tive to maximize returns because strong investment performance makes
it possible to limit worker contributions (Pontusson).
Another key difference with the Japanese pension system is the high
level of built-in controls about how investment decisions are made. The
rules governing the investment of funds are more codified in Sweden and
the central bank plays a key role in overseeing the investment of these
funds. Moreover, the boards that actually manage the funds are organized




state, and thus provide a built-in system of balance between these con-
stituencies. The funds have not been used to pursue the development of
specific industries (Pontusson).
The different ways that Japan and Sweden have institutionalized the
management of their pension systems has important consequences. In
Sweden, the management of pensions is transparent and codified, and
management of the funds is clearly delineated. In Japan, by contrast, labor
and management are both more or less excluded from the investment of
public pensions and do not bear the risks of these investment choices.
One result is that there has not been an incentive to monitor the perfor-
mance of the public pensions. The state, particularly the MOF, is the key
actor in pension management. This has led to a conflict of interests as the
MOF has used the pension funds to achieve both its own ends, as well as
those of the LDP, rather than managing the funds to protect investments.
Bureaucrats and politicians have had a very high degree of discretion over
the management of the funds and there has not been a strong constituency




Private pensions have also come to play an important role in Japan’s
financial system. In the case of Japan, two ways of covering pension
liabilities have led to two distinct types of linkages between private pen-





 plans, firms indicate pension liabilities in their financial
accounts but do not set aside money in a separate fund to cover future
liabilities as with “funded pensions.” In addition to Japan, Germany,
Austria, and Luxembourg have such pension plans. The attraction of book
reserve plans is that they provide firms with an internal source of working
capital. As Philip Manow has pointed out, such working capital is an
important source of “patient capital” for such firms (Manow 2001a,
2001b). Patient capital, unlike equity capital obtained through stock mar-
kets, has a longer time horizon and is provided without major concessions
over management control. Access to this type of capital has a close rela-
tionship to forms of corporate governance and strategies. The manage-
ment, independent of investors demanding short-term profits, allows
companies to invest in longer-term projects and to give priority to the
company’s interest over investors. Indeed, this aspect of Japanese capital-
ism has been widely noted as one of its distinguishing features (Dore;
Estevez-Abe; Gerlach; Manow 2001b). The attraction of access to such
capital explains why book reserve plans have been popular in Japan
despite tax laws that are not very favorable to such plans (Turner and
Watanabe, 56–57). According to a Ministry of Labor Survey in 1997, 46.2
percent of corporate pension plans were book reserve plans (Shimizu).
The downside of such plans, though, is that the viability of the pensions
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depends on the health of the firm, and in the case of book reserve pen-
sions, there are few protections for beneficiaries.
A second method for covering private pension liabilities is through the
creation of a funded corporate pension. Funded corporate pensions form
the basis for Japan’s modern private pension system, which was created
after the public pension system. In 1962, the Japanese government with
the support of life insurance firms and trust banks, which wanted to
manage the private pensions, and Nikkeiren, a peak association of employ-





was designed to provide tax benefits for private pensions. The new pro-
gram would also help employers’ transition from the practice of providing
large lump-sum payments to employees upon retirement with pensions
paid in installments. In 1966, another private pension, the Employee
Pension Fund (
 
k sei nenkin kikin
 
) was established. The Employee Pension
Fund allows firms to manage a portion of their Employee Pension Fund,
in which participation is mandatory, if they provided benefits 30 percent
or higher than that offered by the public portion and if they guaranteed
an annual rate of return of 5.5 percent (this figure has been lowered in
recent years).
While both the Employee Pension Fund and Tax Qualified Pension
allow corporations to control a portion of their pension funds, strict
regulations have governed both how funds are to be invested and
which firms are to handle the management of these funds. The private
opt-out portion of these funds had to be invested through either trust
banks or life insurance companies. As will be discussed below, these
regulations are the key mechanism that allowed bureaucrats to steer
investments toward developmental objectives, but as such regulations
were gradually loosened, a new set of economic problems have
emerged exacerbating Japan’s problem of transitioning to a more liberal
financial system.
Despite these regulations, both private pensions grew rapidly (Table 3
and 4). Growing labor scarcity made the private pensions an attractive
option for firms because attractive benefits could help attract and retain
workers. At least initially, when the labor force was relatively young and
economic growth was rapid, meeting the stipulated benefit level require-
ments was not a problem.
The Employee Pension Fund and Tax Qualified Pension have played
an important role both in promoting industrialization and shaping





tioned earlier, corporations were required to use either trust or life insur-
ance companies, until recently. Both types of companies have been highly
concentrated with several very large firms dominating each line of busi-
ness. The MOF has actively guided their investment decisions to promote
industrialization by instructing these financial institutions to invest in





Funded private pensions, like book reserve plans, also provided a
source of “patient capital” but in very different ways. The private pension
system helped generate patient capital and also reinforced Japan’s system
of corporate governance in two key ways. First, in exchange for the right
to manage a corporation’s pensions, life insurance companies often
invested directly in the corporation whose pension business it received.
Life insurance companies did not pressure the companies in which they
invested for profits, in part, because these companies were not owned by
shareholders, but rather by their clients, collectively as mutual companies.
Over time, life insurance companies became some of the largest equity
holders of Japanese corporations. A second way of creating patient capital
was through the banking system. In anticipation of liberalization in the
1960s, the government, corporations and banks feared foreign competi-
tion and the takeover of Japanese banks. In response to this threat, the
MOF coordinated the purchase of bank shares by life insurance compa-





























1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Tax-qualified pension (trillion yen) 15 16 16 17 18 19




: Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare.
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capital, their lending to corporations was shielded from the demands for
short-term gain (Estevez-Abe).
In South Korea and Germany, pensions have been a source of patient
capital as well. In South Korea, Article 28 of the Labor Standards Act
enacted in 1953 requires employers to provide a lump-sum payment upon
retirement equal to one month’s salary (of the final three months of
employment) for every year of service. This “retirement allowance
scheme” has few regulations governing how the funds should be accu-
mulated and managed. Firms can keep pension reserves in-house and use
them as a source of internal capital. Firms have often used the reserves
as working capital or as collateral for loans (Moon).
Similarly, in Germany, private pensions have served as an important
source of internal capital. After World War II, the German government
used restrictive credit policies to help channel credit to key industries for
post-war reconstruction. Using tax incentives, the German government
was able to make investments in government industrial bonds and con-
struction more attractive. To counter the potential negative effects of the
restrictive access to capital, the government allowed private pensions to
develop into a source of internal credit. Tax incentives encouraged the
formation of private pensions. Also, accumulated reserves could be
treated as “book reserves” which meant that pension commitments could
be recorded simply as a future commitment. Prior to pension payout,
funds could be used as a source of internal capital. As a result of these
policies, private pensions became an important source of internal capital.
As Manow points out, this internal investment also helped build solidar-
ity with employees by showing a commitment to reinvestment in a com-
pany (Manow 2001b).
 
THE CHALLENGES: UNWINDING THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
 
While Japan does clearly face many of the same “external” pressures on
its pension system as other advanced industrialized countries, such as an
aging population and low fertility, there are other problems that are the
legacy of how pensions have been integrated into Japan’s financial system
and recent attempts to transition to a more liberal financial regime. Recent
reforms—regulatory, corporate accounting, and administrative—related
to Japan’s on-going process of transitioning out of its developmental
regime have opened an economic and political Pandora’s box with respect
to the pension system. Underfunded private pensions have turned out to
be major liabilities for many companies’ balance sheets as firms prepare
for transition to new accounting rules. Deregulation of private pension
investments has increased incentives to focus on pension returns and
weakened incentives to hold onto cross-holdings, which in turn has cre-
ated downward pressure on the stock market, exacerbating Japan’s bank-
ing problems. Administrative reforms have partly removed public




sion funds will be invested and who will exercise control over fund
management have emerged as contested and not fully resolved political
issues.  This  section  discusses  the  nature  of  these  challenges,  focusing
on how deregulation, administrative reform, and changes in corporate





As described above, private pensions have played an important role in
Japan’s system of finance. Book reserve plans provide firms with a source
of patient capital, and the MOF has used highly regulated private pension




 ties and to promote industrial development.
While such integration into Japan’s financial system has played a role
supportive of Japan’s past developmental policies, it has also contributed
to large pension liabilities that are likely to be a drain on corporate profits
for years to come.
Several features of Japan’s private pension system have weakened the
incentive to focus on pension investment returns and delayed reaction to
the growing problem of pension liabilities. First, regulations have limited
how funds can be invested and who can invest these funds. As described
earlier, regulations required that trust banks or insurance firms handle
pension fund management. Asset allocation requirements have also stip-
ulated the ratio of investments, including limits on the amounts that could
be invested in securities, bonds, foreign companies, etc. These regulations
have meant that firms have had very little control over how pension funds
are invested, and thus pension liability problems have been largely
beyond their control. At the same time, firms were required to provide
returns on the Employee Pension funds of 5.5 percent until 1996 when
the rate was lowered to 2.5 percent. If the companies’ investments do not
yield the required returns, they are responsible for covering the differ-
ence. During Japan’s boom years, these targets were easy to meet, how-
ever, as Japan’s economic growth slowed, its asset bubble collapsed, and
Japan entered a decade of multiple recessions, the required rate of return
proved difficult, if not impossible, to meet. The result has been poor
pension fund performance. Trust bank returns on pensions between 1985
and 1995 were only 59 percent. The comparable figure for the United
States was 249 percent over the same period (Economist). In terms of
compound annual growth the Japanese figure is less than 5.3 percent.
Between 1989 and 1997, the return on all corporate pension investments




 1999). According to the Ministry of
Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW), of 1,858 funds only 30 percent were




Second, corporate accounting rules have allowed firms to keep their
pensions off their main balance sheets. This means that pension perfor-
mance has not had any direct impact on the firms’ bottom lines (e.g., net
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profit/loss). During Japan’s period of rapid economic and population
growth, pension investments performed well and this accounting practice
had little consequence. But this accounting practice, combined with
another accounting rule that allowed firms to use the price at which they
purchased investments “book value” rather than their current market
value to assess pension assets, allowed firms to ignore mounting pension
problems even as the book value began to diverge sharply with actual
market value.
The problem of pension liabilities, though, has existed for some time.
Changes in corporate accounting have exacerbated the problem substan-
tially by changing the impact of these pension liabilities on firms. In an
effort to facilitate the ability of firms to raise funds on international capital
markets, Japan has inched toward “international accounting standards.”
Since the end of the fiscal year in 1997, corporations have been required
to use mark-to-market accounting rules for pensions. Prior to this change,
corporations used book values rather than actual market values. This
accounting practice, though, has drastically overstated the true value of
many firm assets, including pension investments. Many investments have
been assessed on the basis of their purchase value, but since the collapse
of the bubble at the end of the 1980s the market value of stocks and real
estate has dropped precipitously. With Japan’s new accounting changes,
firms must revalue their pension assets downward.
Another key change is that as of March 2001, firms must publish their
pension reserve status. The prospect of greater public and shareholder
scrutiny created a much sharper incentive for many firms to clear up their
pension shortfalls, which for the largest 65 corporations alone equaled 6.2





 1999). Japanese firms have been given a 15-year period to
solve their pension shortfall problem, a process that will eat into future
earnings.
Japan has also transitioned to consolidated accounting starting in April
2000. Under this accounting system, liabilities that were kept off the books
(e.g., pension liabilities) are to be included in consolidated statements.
With the inclusion of pension liabilities, companies suddenly will have
dramatically poorer balance sheets. Net income, price/earnings ratios,
cash flows, and debt-to-equity ratios will all be affected. Some companies
have started to fix their pension problems in expectation of these changes.
In one six-month period in 1999, Nissan, for instance, set aside about $2.6





earlier, the scope of the problem is very large as only 30 percent of private
pension funds are solvent. The transition to consolidated accounting,
however, has been a slow process and as others have pointed out, Japa-
nese corporate finance and governance reforms have followed a path very
different than in Anglo-American countries (Vogel). In fact, the transition









teeth in Japanese corporate reforms reflects the reluctance to unleash
many of the problems bottling up in Japan’s pension system.
In the meantime, one “solution” to the funding problem has been a
fairly draconian one. Many Japanese firms are choosing simply to dis-
solve their Employee Pension Funds. As may be recalled earlier, the
Employee Pension Funds provides benefit levels higher than the national
pension. But if a fund becomes insolvent, firms can seek approval from
the MHLW, to dissolve their funds. In order to dissolve a fund, firms
apply at the Regional Public Welfare Office (
 
chih  k sei kyoku
 
), then the
application is forwarded to the Minister of Health, Labor, and Welfare
for approval. In recent years, firms that are dissolving their Employer
Pension Funds have grown dramatically. In FY2000, a record of 29
Employee Pension Funds were dissolved (Nagamori). A survey by the





 2002). Employers also now
have the opportunity to take advantage of a new defined benefit Japa-




 The new 401(K) transfers
pension investment risk from firms to workers, a fact not lost on Rengo,
Japan’s confederation of labor unions, which ineffectually opposed the
creation of a defined contribution plan. Rengo, in a public statement,
complained that the new 401(K) bill “mitigates the burden and responsi-
bility of a company under the name of self-responsibility and ‘choice’” of
an individual, and imputes an investment risk to an individual
(Sasamori).
Another more complex problem is related to the unwinding of corpo-
rate cross-holdings and the downward pressure created on asset prices,
in particular stocks. The mass liquidation of cross-holdings, it is feared,
will lower the price of stocks, many of which are held by banks that are
currently in precarious financial condition. Lowering the capital base of
banks in turn adversely affects BIS capital ratios, further adding to Japan’s
credit crunch.
The causes of the unwinding corporate cross-holdings are multiple,
many having little to do with the pension system. One regulation, for
instance, has directly limited the amount of cross-holdings that can be
held by a company. Another proximate cause is related to changes in
corporate accounting mentioned above. With mark-to-market valuations,
firms have no incentive to hold on to stocks that have been revalued
according to market prices. In the past, holding on to such inflated assets
padded balance sheets, but since this is no longer an option, it is expected
that many firms will get rid of unproductive assets.
There are, however, other ways in which the unwinding of corporate
cross-holdings is related to Japan’s corporate pension system. As men-
tioned earlier, Japan’s corporate pension system in the past helped solid-




 ties and cross-holdings. Firms that
opted-out and chose to create their own Employee Pension Funds did so
through life insurance companies or trust banks which were already
o o
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 groups or at least invested in the companies
whose pension business they received.
There have been several critical changes that have begun to undermine
this system, the most important of which has been the loosening of restric-
tions on Employee Pension Fund and the Tax Qualified Pensions. Begin-
ning in the 1990s, a series of deregulatory measures have given greater
discretion to companies over their pension investments. In 1990, compa-
nies with Employee Pension funds were permitted for the first time to
use investment advisory companies to manage new contributions to their
funds. In 1994, up to one-third of an Employee Pension Fund could be
invested through investment advisory firms. In short, the trust bank and
life insurance monopoly over the pension business had eroded. In the
same year, the restrictions over the allocation of investments were also
liberalized. The so-called 5-3-3-2 rule, which stipulated 50 percent invest-
ment in domestic principal-guaranteed investments, 30 percent in domes-
tic equities, 30 percent in foreign securities, and 20 percent in property,
was gradually loosened. In 1997, firms with Employee Pension Funds
could manage their own plans internally although they were still required
to follow guidelines for asset allocations. In 1998, companies were given
total discretion over asset-allocation decisions. The Tax Qualified Plans
have been deregulated, but more slowly. In 1997, firms with such plans
were permitted to invest on their own.
With full control over their investments, firms now have more options
for maximizing their pension returns, in some cases by jettisoning their
trust banks or life insurance companies. And critically, now that the lia-
bilities of their pensions are both public and affect their bottom line, firms
have every incentive to do so. As a result, there is less reason to maintain
close ties with their trust banks or life insurance companies. Similarly,
these firms have less incentive to hold on to many of the shares of their
clients if they no longer manage their pension funds. Moreover, new
accounting changes raise the short-term costs for holding onto bad invest-
ments, as investors scrutinize pension liabilities more. In short, the pen-
sion system that helped provide patient capital and promote corporate
ties is coming undone. Life insurance banks and trust banks are some of
the largest institutional shareholders in Japan; if they sell off shares, there
is a real possibility of significant share price declines. In 1990, life insurers
owned 17.3 percent of Japanese shares. There are no separate figures for
trust banks, but for all banks the figure is 22.5 percent (Estevez-Abe, table
9.4, 205). In the beginning of 2003, stock market investors have closely
followed the activities of pension funds by tracking trust fund activities,
which are used as a proxy for pension fund investment. Trust fund invest-






One outstanding question, though, is how fast these ties will come
undone. As Figure 1 shows, the use of financial advisors, either in-house




the share of Employee Pension Fund managed by financial advisors rose
from 0.2 percent to 7.4 percent.
While the increase is rapid, the share is still relatively small, a predict-
able result considering how recently investment has been deregulated.
Firms have also started to make asset allocations on their own. Of firms
with Employee Pension Funds, 36.9 percent are reported to have taken
some responsibility in making asset allocation. The figure is substantially




1999). The transition to more independent investment decision making





Among the ironies of Japan’s pension problems, one of the most strik-
ing is that the government may use pensions to attempt to solve the
problem posed by the liquidation of cross-holdings, sagging stock prices,
and distressed banks. One idea that has been discussed publicly is encour-
aging corporations to transfer newly market-valued stocks to their
Employer Pension Funds in order to prevent a sell-off. Firms, though,
have little incentive to do so after they have revalued their pensions’
assets, since they no longer have any reason to hold onto to such invest-
ments to prop up their balance sheet numbers. More critically, doing so
may not be in their best interest if unproductive assets are transferred.
This plan potentially goes directly against many of the reforms, such as
investment deregulation and corporate accounting changes, which would
make firms more sensitive to returns on their pension investments.
FIGURE 1
 




















Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
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Another more radical option is government-led intervention in the
stock market to prop up stock prices. In the early 1990s, public pension
funds and postal savings were used in this manner, in some cases to
directly counteract the effect of sell-offs of private pension holdings.
These interventions were dubbed “price-keeping operations” or PKOs.
These interventions have continued into the latter half of the 1990s,
although the government is often not forthcoming about its interventions.
But this takes us full circle back to public pension funds and the debate
over who should control these funds, an issue that lies at the core of




As suggested above, there is an ironic connection between the public and
private pension system. Private pension sell-offs have put downward
pressure on the stock market, and the government has used its public
pension funds to intervene in the stock market to prop up stocks in an
effort to stave off financial disaster. This, however, is only one aspect of
a larger story over the control of Japan’s extremely large, partially
funded public pension system. Despite its enormous demographic chal-
lenges, more severe than those even of Germany, the amount of Japan’s
public pension funds over the course of the next several decades will
continue to be very large.
As Table 5 shows, even by the year 2050 the reserves of the Employee
Pension will be roughly equal to one’s years benefit expenditures if the
projections are accurate. Who will control the pension funds and under
what conditions investments will be made is a heated political issue that
has yet to be resolved.
The issue of control of public pension funds has been around for
decades. The MHLW (at the time MHW) has argued that they should
manage the pension funds, because they would oversee fund perfor-
mance more vigilantly than the MOF, which has distributed funds to a
wide range of public corporations that have been criticized as inefficient
and wasteful. The MHLW won some control over the pension funds when
the MOF agreed to lend a portion of pension funds to an existing public
corporation—the Public Welfare Services Corporation—under the juris-
diction of the MHLW. In 1987, the Public Welfare Services Corporation,
or “nenpuku” (short for 
 
nenkin fukushi jigy dan
 
), began setting up a pen-
sion fund program that would have 13 separate funds.
Nenpuku operated by borrowing money from the Trust Fund Bureau
and investing it. The initial belief was that Nenpuku would be able to
secure gains above the 5.5 percent rate at which it borrowed funds from
the Trust Fund Bureau. Nenpuku gradually borrowed more from the
Trust Fund and invested it independently. As with the corporate pensions,
the asset allocations were highly regulated. Until 1990, Nenpuku was
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Nenpuku also had to invest through trust banks and life insurance com-
panies. The government gradually loosened asset allocations require-
ments, and Nenpuku subsequently invested more in equities, which in





But the investment performance of Nenpuku has been dismal. At the end
of fiscal year 2000, Nenpuku had invested 27 trillion yen. The cumulative
loss on investment was 1.46 trillion yen. If the interest payment that
Nenpuku must pay back to the Trust Fund Bureau is included, the total





The story of control of the public pensions shifted dramatically in the
late 1990s with the reform of the entire FILP set in motion by Prime
Minister Hashimoto as part of his administrative reforms. In the past, the
funds from two of the public pensions (Employee Pension and National
Pension) as well as the postal savings deposits were transferred, as stip-
ulated by law, to the Trust Fund Bureau, overseen by the MOF, which
distributed the funds through FILP. Reformers, though, increasingly crit-
icized the MOF’s management of the funds. This criticism accelerated





 The public corporations that received these funds and





heaven) also came under increasing attack, and in some cases led to calls
for their abolition or privatization.
The outcome of these reform efforts was the breakup of the FILP
system. As of April 2001, pension funds and postal savings deposits would
no longer be transferred to the MOF. As part of this restructuring, the
Public Welfare Services Corporation was abolished. Its debts were to be
paid out of the public pension system. Nenpuku was replaced by the
Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), another public corporation
that was established on April 1, 2001. Unlike Nenpuku, the GPIF would
have direct control over the pension funds and thus would not have to
pay interest for “borrowing” from the pension fund. Although the new




), the break with the
MOF is in practice not complete. The GPIF will continue to buy new
special “FILP bonds” with public pension funds over a seven-year tran-
sition period. The purchase of these bonds will in effect keep some funds
flowing to the MOF over the next seven years. The possible continuation
of the purchase of these bonds at least creates the possibility that the old
system will not be fully broken up, but at this point the issue of whether
or not the link to the MOF will be fully broken is one of speculation.
There were several justifications for creating the new GPIF. The MHLW
argued that it would be more vigilant in pursing an investment strategy
to maximize return and limit risk. Another key reason put forward by the
MHLW was that the government should not be a direct investor in private
companies. As a public corporation, the GPIF would serve as an interme-










be able to better staff itself with experts in investment and other relevant
skills.
The largest opposition party, the Democrats (Minshuto), has been
quick to attack the transfer of funds to MHLW. The MHLW, they have
argued, has neither the capacity to oversee these investments nor the track
record, as Nenpuku’s short and unsuccessful experience illustrates. Naoto
Kan, one of the leading spokespersons for the Democrats and former
Minister of MHLW, publicly asked, “How can you assure us that the
Health and Welfare Ministry can do better with the 140 trillion yen after






It remains to be seen to what extent pension investments will be free
from political interference or bureaucratic interests remains to be seen. To
date, a combination of political motives and bureaucratic preferences has
driven the investment of public pensions. MOF bureaucrats and LDP
politicians have at various points in time used pension funds for indus-
trialization, a way to finance government debt, and to prop up the price
of the stock market. Politicians have also used the FILP system to finance
pork-barrel projects, and bureaucrats have used funds to create cushy jobs
for themselves when they retire by funding public corporations where
they occupy posts after retiring as bureaucrats. These pressures will con-
tinue. In January 2001, Kamei Shizuka, chairman of the Policy Affairs
Council, one of the most powerful positions within the LDP with direct
responsibility for policy making, created the Committee on Stock Market





member, Aizawa Hideyuki, head of the Council and LDP member, can-
didly remarked, “Some party members say we should refrain from inter-





 2001a). This remark nicely captures the dilemma posed by the
massive financial resources of the pension reserves (and postal savings)—
it is difficult not to use such resources to solve problems, whether they
are economic or political.
The MHLW does, however, appear to have a much more direct stake
in fund performance and recognizes that its performance will be heavily
scrutinized. The MHLW appears to want to improve fund performance
in order to limit premium increases and to minimize outside political and
bureaucratic influence. There are, though, several indications that suggest
that the funds may still be subject to political and bureaucratic influence.
First, the law itself, the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF)
Law, is relatively vague. As a professor from Keio University, Kato
Hideki, testified before the Diet, “Rules to oblige [the ministry] to be
cautious in managing funds are written in the bills, but they are abstract.
It’s essential to require [bureaucrats] to take responsibility for the results




 1999b). Also, although investment allo-
cation targets will be drawn up, this process is being handled through a
special deliberation council, a process susceptible to bureaucratic steering.
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At the moment, two MHLW study groups are discussing asset allocations,
as well as guidelines about how the GPIF should behave as a shareholder
in private companies. No final decisions have been made. Moreover, even
if the asset allocations are fixed, they can easily be changed, a provision
written into the law itself. And finally, the management of the GPIF is not
insulated from political pressure. The minister of MHLW appoints the
chairman of GPIF to a four-year term and the supervisor to a two-year
term. The director, in turn, with the approval of the MHLW, appoints two





Thus far, the GPIF appears to be susceptible to bureaucratic and polit-
ical influence as funds appear to be used in PKO-like interventions. The
deliberation council for setting allocation targets, as well as the MHLW
have both publicly stated their support for investment in domestic stocks
despite rising public criticism and poor investment performance. Indeed,
purchases of domestic stocks have increased as a share of total portfolio
allocation with the government planning to invest 1.7 trillion yen in
domestic stocks over the current fiscal year. Interestingly, this sum is more






This discussion of how open the GPIF will be to political pressure may
soon be moot. The highly popular Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro has
been launching a highly publicized reform campaign, much of it targeted
toward Japan’s web of public corporations. He is pushing to abolish or
privatize 34 out of 163 of these public corporations. In the reform proposal
drawn up by Minister of Administrative Reform Ishihara Nobuteru, the
abolition of GPIF was recommended. The MHLW has predictably
responded very negatively to this proposal and argued that the govern-
ment should not directly take stakes in private companies. The GPIF has
also argued that direct government control might lead to further PKOs.
Minister Tsutomu Sakaguchi of the MHLW publicly alluded to this influ-
ence, “When the government invests a large amount of funds, it exerts





). The MHLW has also argued that the government should not
directly own stocks because that would put the government in the posi-
tion of exercising influence over corporate decision making. The MHLW
issued a statement, “If the country directly manages stocks there is a





 2001). The GPIF as a public corporation, the MHLW claims,
creates a firewall between the government and corporations. But on the
other hand, not exercising shareholder rights and influencing corporate
management may potentially work against fund performance. The pre-
cise extent to which the GPIF should exercise its shareholder rights,
though, has not been clearly determined.
A final decision has yet to be made about the fate of the GPIF. For the




the subject will be revisited. But ultimately even if Junichiro or another
prime minister does abolish the GPIF, this would only reopen the issue




Japan’s private and public pensions have been deeply integrated into its
developmental financial system. Public pensions were directly tied to one
of the key institutions of Japan’s developmental state—the Fiscal and
Investment Loan Program. Private pensions facilitated the creation of
“patient capital” and solidified business networks. But the tight integra-
tion with Japan’s system of corporate finance and state financial instru-
ments has triggered a series of problems, almost a domino effect, as Japan
transitioned out of this regime. Changes in corporate accounting stan-
dards have exposed the private pension system’s underfunding; and in
the case of public pensions, as the accumulated funds dramatically
increased, a political battle has ensued over how these funds should be
used and by whom, issues that have yet to be resolved.
The case of Japanese pensions shows that the ways in which pensions
are integrated into a country’s political economy have long-term implica-
tions and that a specific politics follows from these choices. The nature of
this integration has created a distinct set of problems and a specific
politics of reform that distinguish Japan’s pension politics from other
advanced industrialized countries. The relatively unique trajectory of
Japan’s pension system can be summarized as follows:
• Pension policies were highly integrated with Japan’s developmental
financial system.
• The easing of developmental policies (e.g., deregulation, corporate
reform, and liberalization) interacted with and exacerbated pension
problems more generally.
• These pension problems are structural, difficult to reform and linked
to reconfiguring state, finance, and firm relationships.
 
Pensions policies are highly integrated with the financial system.
 
 Japan’s pen-
sion system reflects the country’s developmental course. The degree and
extent of the integration of Japan’s pension policies with economic and
industrial ones has been very high compared to those of other advanced
industrialized countries. Although pensions have been used for eco-
nomic, industrial and other ends in European countries—corporate
finance in Germany, social investment in Sweden, etc.—there are impor-
tant differences. In contrast to Germany, Japan’s 
 
public and private pensions
 
have been leveraged to raise capital for economic development. In Ger-
many, experience with inflation, which destroyed the value of pension
funds, exposed the dangers of its partially funded pension system, and
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since 1957, the German public pension fund has been PAYG (pay as you
go). While Sweden’s public pension, like Japan’s, is partially funded, the
funds have been controlled by the unions and managed by tripartite
corporatist boards. As a result, the funds have not been used primarily
for industrialization, but rather as a way to advance the mutual interests
of labor and capital.
 
The easing of developmental policies interacts with and exacerbates pension
problems.
 
 Japan’s developmental legacy and the ways in which pensions
have become entwined with this system explain some of the pension
problems that Japan currently faces. Japan, like many other advanced
industrial countries, faces pressure from a wide range of demographic
trends—low fertility and an aging population—economic stagnation and
fiscal constraints. Indeed, in many cases, Japan’s problems in these areas
are more severe than those of Western countries. Nonetheless, there is
another set of relatively unique problems that are related to Japan’s devel-
opmental legacy and the difficulties Japan has had in transitioning out of
this model. The literature on retrenchment in Western countries does not
provide much analytic leverage in understanding these problems—such
as  massive  private  pension  liabilities  and  the  battle  for control over
Japan’s public pension funds, which arose as Japan attempted to change
its models of corporate governance, corporate finance, and public finance.
 
These pension problems are structural, difficult to reform, and linked to recon-
figuring state, finance, and firm relationships.
 
 One pattern that has emerged
from the comparative study of pension reforms in Europe and the United
States is that reforms tend to be modest, incremental, negotiated, and
mostly focused on shoring up the fiscal viability of the pension systems.
Other work has shown that pensions can be saved through combining
modest benefit cuts and contribution increases with increased fertility,
lower unemployment, increased labor force participation, and higher eco-
nomic growth (Boldrin, Dolado, Jimeno, and Peracchi). The case of Japan
suggests a different picture. Because of the high level of integration with
its developmental regime, reforms of the pension system are more inti-
mately linked to Japan’s restructuring of its economy at large. In partic-
ular, liberalization, deregulation, and transition to new modes of
financing require a more fundamental reconfiguration of the relations




The research for this article began at the Department of Political Science
at the University of California, Berkeley. The resulting article has bene-
fited from the thoughtful suggestions of Jonah Levy, T. J. Pempel, and
Steven Vogel, all from Berkeley. Charles Weathers of Osaka City Univer-
sity also provided insightful critiques. And finally, three anonymous
reviewers with extensive knowledge of the topics covered in this article





1. On industrial relations, see Manow 2001a and also Ebbinghaus and Manow. 
See Estevez-Abe; Jackson and Vitols; and Manow 2001b for literature explor-
ing the connection between finance and pensions. This article builds on this 
new literature.
2. The line between PAYG systems and funded systems is not clear-cut. Demo-
graphic shifts, such as declining birth rates and a growing elderly popula-
tion, can push funded systems into future deficits, essentially converting
them into PAYG systems. This demographic dynamic is on the horizon in
Japan, and Japanese pension assets are expected to decline.
3. For a political account of why Japan’s pension system is fragmented, see
Campbell.
4. See Estevez-Abe for a detailed description of the connection between pen-
sions and corporate governance.
5. The Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Labor were merged
in January 2001.
6. The “Defined Contribution Pension Law”—
 
Kakutei kyoshitsu nenkin ho
 
—was
passed on October 1, 2001.
7. Examples include the Honshu-Shikoku Bridge and the Japan National Rail-
ways Settlement Corporation.
8. There are others within the LDP and among its minor coalition partners




Nenkin Shikin Unyou Kikin Ho
 
 (Government Pension Investment Fund
Law). Available online at http://www.hourei.mhlw.go.jp
REFERENCES
Baldwin, Peter. 1990. 
 
The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases in the European
Welfare State, 1987–1975
 
. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Boldrin, Michael, Juan J. Dolado, Juan F. Jimeno, and Franco Peracchi. 1999.





Bonoli, Giuliano. 2000. 
 
The Politics of Pension Reform, Institutions and Policy Change
in Western Europe
 
. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, John C. 1992. 
 
How Policies Change, The Japanese Government and the Aging
Society
 
. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Dore, Ronald. 2000. 
 
Stock market Capitalism, Welfare Capitalism: Japan and Germany
vs. the Anglo-Saxons
 
. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ebbinghaus, Bernhard, and Philip Manow. 2001. 
 
Comparing Welfare Capitalism:









Esping-Andersen, Gosta, and Walter Korpi. 1984. Social Policy as Class Politics in
Post-War Capitalism: Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany. In John Goldthorpe,
ed., 
 
Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism
 
, pp. 179–208. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2001. The Forgotten Link: The Financial Regulation of
Japanese Pensions Funds in Comparative Perspective. In Bernhard Ebbinghaus
and Philip Manow, eds., 
 
Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy and Political
Economy in Europe, Japan and the USA
 
, pp. 190–216. London: Routledge.
Gerlach, Michael. 1992. 
 
Alliance Capitalism, The Social Organization of Japanese Busi-
ness
 
. Berkeley: University of California Press.
 
POLITICAL–ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF PENSIONS IN JAPAN 571
 
Jackson, Gregory, and Sigurt Vitols. 2001. Between Financial Commitment, Mar-
ket Liquidity and Corporate Governance: Occupational Pensions in Britain,
Germany, Japan and the USA. In Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Philip Manow,
eds., 
 
Comparing Welfare Capitalism: Social Policy and Political Economy in Europe,
Japan and the USA
 




. 1999a. Parties Slam Asset Transfers. December 1. Available online at
http://www.japantimes.com
———. 1999b. Health Bureaucrats’ Investment Prowess Questioned. December 3.
Available online at http://www.japantimes.com
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. 
 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle
 
. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Manow, Philip. 2001a. 
 
Wage Coordination and the Welfare State: Germany and Japan
Compared
 
. Max Planck Institute for Social Research Working Paper 00/7,




Globalization, Corporate Finance, and Coordinated Capitalism: Pension
Finance in Germany and Japan
 
. Max Planck Institute for Social Research Working
Paper 01/5, August.
Moon, Hyungpyo. 2001. 
 
The Korean Pension System: Present and Future
 
. Seoul,
Korea: Korean Development Institute.
Myles, John, and Paul Pierson. 2001. The Comparative Political Economy of Pen-
sion Reform. In Paul Pierson, ed., 
 
The New Politics of the Welfare State
 
, pp. 305–
333. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Nagamori,  Hidekazu.  2001.  Employee  Pension  Funds  Dissolving  One  by
One. In 
 
NikkeiNet Pension Business Focus, 2001
 





. 1999. Nissan Motor Reports 6-month Loss of More than $3 Billion.








). 2001. Sakaguchi k sei r d  sh
nenkin shikin uny  kikin kuni no uny  ni shinch  (Sakaguchi Deliberation of
the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare Government Pension Investment
Fund). July 3.
Nikkei Financial Daily. 2001. Nenkin shikin uny  kikin kor sh  haishi ni hanron—
kuni no chokkusetsu uny  no zehi sh ten (The Counterargument against Abol-
ishing the Pension Fund Corporation—The Pros and Cons of Direct Goven-
ment Investment). October 26.
———. 2002. Over 20% of Pension Funds Consider Dissolving: Survey. February
6. Available online at Nikkei Net, http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp
Nikkei Weekly. 1999. The Pension Business in Japan. Available online at Nikkei Net,
http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/AC/FEAT/pension/penbusiness.html
———. 2001a. LDP Charts Tactics to End Stock Slump. January 22. Available
online at Nikkei Net, http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp
———. 2001b. Fizzling Stock Prices Pummel Finances at Public Pension Body.
July 16. Available online at Nikkei Net, http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp
———. 2003. Market Scramble: New Year Puts the Focus on Pension Funds. April
1. Available online at Nikkei Net, http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp
Pierson, Paul. 1996. The New Politics of the Welfare State. World Politics 48:143–
179.
Pontusson, Jonas. 1992. The Limits of Social Democracy, Investment Politics in Sweden.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Sasamori, Kiyoshi. 2000. Kakutei kyoshitsu nenkin hoan no sangiin ts ka ni
taisuru danwa (Comments on the Upper House Decision to Pass the Pension
Bill). Available online at http://www.jtuc-rengo.or.jp/new/iken/danwa/
danwa20010612b.html






Shibata, Yoko. 1999. Japan’s Pension Battleground. Global Finance 13:29–30.
Shimizu, Tokihiko. 1999. Overview of the Corporate Pension Scheme in Japan. Ministry
of Health and Welfare, December. Available online at http://www.inprs.org/
data/countries/reports/japancountryreport.pdf
Turner, John, and Noriyasu Watanabe. 1995. Private Pension Policies in Industrialized
Countries. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Research Employment.
Vogel, Steven. 2003. The Reorganization of Organized Capitalism: How the Ger-
man and Japanese Models Are Shaping Their Own Transformation. In Wolf-
gang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura, eds., The End of Diversity?: Prospects for
German and Japanese Capitalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
